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RECENT CASES
contract had existed, and thus allow recovery on quantum meruit
for the reasonable value of the legal services rendered5
The instant case reaches a result contrary to the weight of authority by a confused application of doctrines of equity and contract.
Although finding that the express contract was void, the court
indicates that its terms are, nevertheless, valid to determine the
services and expenditures for which recovery may be had; and by
some twist of reasoning the illegal taint of the express contract is
transferred so as to defeat an action to recover for the reasonable
value of services rendered in good faith. It is submitted that the
void original contingent fee contract is totally ineffective and should
have no bearing upon plaintiff's right to recover in quantum meruit.'2
Florence A. Vande Bogart
CONTRACTS-THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES-DONEE, CREDITOR, AND INCIDENTAL BENEFICIARIES. Plaintiff leased part
of a building as a storage space for stock. The lessor subsequently
contracted to have an automatic sprinkler system signalling device
installed in the building by the defendant. Because of faulty operation of the system and leakage, the plaintiff's stock was damaged.
Upon suit it was held that plaintiff was an incidental beneficiary as
distinguished from a donee or creditor beneficiary and could not
recover. There was no intent of the contracting parties to recognize
the plaintiff as the primary person to be benefited. Marlboro Shirt
Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 77 A.2d 776 (Md., 1951).
The majority of the courts hold that a third party donee or
creditor beneficiary may sue on a contract made for his benefit,' but
that an incidental beneficiary cannot sue on the contract.'
This
positive rule allowing a third party to sue is based on the proposition
that the law operates on the act of the parties, thus creating the
duty, establishing the privity and implying the promise and obligations on which the action is founded.! The third party's right of
action is not, however, dependent upon the consideration running
directly from him.'
The majority rule has been embodied in the statutes of several
states, including North Dakota,5 and with regard to these statutes,
10 McCurdy v. Dillon, 135 Mich. 678, 98 N.W. 746 (1904); Klampe v.
Klampe, 137 Minn. 227, 163 N.W. 295 (1917); Lynde v. Lynde, 64
N.J. Eq. 736, 52 At. 694 (1902). Contra: Barngrover v. Pettigrew, 128
Ia. 533. 104 N.W. 904 (1905).
78 A.2d at 242(1951): "We . . . remand.
for further proceedings
... The plaintiff\ should have an opportunity to present evidence of the
services and expenditures . . . for which the original undertaking did
not provide."
Cf. Baca v. Padilla. 26, N.M. 223, 190 Pac. 730 (1920).
Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 190 Md. 52, 57 A.2d 318
(1948): Williston, Contracts §356 (rev. ed. 1936).
Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731 (1938).
3 Packer v. Board of Retirement, 203 P.2d 784 (Cal. 1949), rev'd. on other
grounds, 217 P.2d 660 (1950); Tweddale v. Tweddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93
N.W. 440 (1903); Small v. Schaefer, 24 Md. 143, 159 (1866).
McDonald v. Finseth, 32 N.D. 400, 155 N.W. 863 (1916); In re
McCanna's Estate, 230 Wis. 561, 284 N.W. 502 (1939).
N.D. Rev. Code §9-0204 (1943): "A contract made expressly for the
benefit of a third person may be enforced by him at any time before the
parties thereto rescind it.'"
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the courts are in accord in the view that a benefit which is purely
incidental andl which the parties did not contemplate, though resulting from performance of the contract, will not avail the third party
of a cause of action on the contract.' The intent of the parties to
confer %benefit upon the third party is the important element, and
"it must appear . . . by the direct terms of the contract, that it was
made for the benefit of such (third) parties. It cannot be implied
from the fact that the contract would, if carried out between the
parties to it, operate incidentally to their benefit."' "To be a third
party beneficiary entitled to recover on a contract it is not ernough
that it be intended by one of the parties to the contract and the
third person that the latter should be benefited, but both parties to
the contract must so intend and must indicate that intention in the
contract . . . The obligation to the third party must be created, and
must affirmatively appear, in the contract itself . . ."I Benefit without intent to benefit does not avail the third party of a cause of
action." But, the intent is a matter of interpretation of the contract,
with all surrounding circumstances taken into consideration." The
tenant's right to recover from the promisor for the reason that the
contract was made for his benefit might be influenced by the tenant's
occupancy of the premises prior or subsequent to the contract. However, in one case the tenant was not allowed to recover where his
tenancy was subsequent to the contract,' whereas in another case
of subsequent tenancy recovery was allowed on the ground that the
agreement was made in anticipation of future occupancy of the
premises by a tenant."
Grismore suggests that the utility of the intent test may well be
doubted because of the speculation which must often attach to a
search of the motives of the parties." The author indicates that the
test which seems to run through all of the cases, though the courts
have not expressed it in this language, is this: whenever a promisor
has promised to render a performance directly to the third person
the latter can enforce'it as having been made for his benefit; but if
a Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200 (1940);
State v. Padgett, 54 N.D. 211, 209 N.W. 388 (1926) citing Farmers'
State Bank of Gladstone v. Anton, 51 N.D. 202, 199 N.W. 582 (1924).
7 Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 271 Pac. 898 (1928);
Swift Lumber & Fuel Co. v. Hock, 124 Neb. 30, 245 N.W. 3 (1932);
Parlin v. Hall, 2 N.D. 473, 52 N.W. 405 (1892); Cf. DeLuxe Glass Co. v.
Martin, 208 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1949), where the court, said, .... so long
as the contract necessarily and directly benefits the third person, it is
immaterial that this protection was afforded him, not as an end in itself,
but for the sole purpose of securing to the promisee some consequent
benefit or immunity . . . It is to be borne in mind that the parties are
presumed to intend the consequences of a performance of the contract.
That which is contemplated by the terms of the contract is 'intended' by
the parties."
Chung Kee v. Davidson, 73 Cal. 522, 15 Pac. 100 (1887).
Spires v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 364 Pa. 52, 70 A.2d 828, 830 (1950).
Johnson v. Clark, 39 N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 1949); Borough of Brooklawn
Housing Corporation, 124 N.J.L. 73, 11 A.2d 83 (1940).
Colonial Discount Co. v. Avon Motors, Inc., 137 Conn. 196, 75 A.2d 507
(1950); Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett, 346 Ill. 252, 178 N.E. 498
(1931).
22
Swift Lumber & Fuel Co. v. Hock, 124 Neb. 30, 245 N.W. 3 (1932).
13
Werner v. Kent Parking Garage, 133 N.J.L. 104, 42 A.2d 707 (1945).
14
Grismore, Law on Contracts §234 (1947).

RECENT CASES
the benefit to the third person is indirect, if it springs from a performance agreed to be rendered to the promisee, then the third
party is only an incidental beneficiary and not entitled to sue on the
contract.
Weston R. Christopherson

EMINENT DOMAIN-DETERMINATION OF MARKET VALUE"GOING BUSINESS" AS ELEMENT OF VALUE. The city of Dallas
instituted condemnation proceedings to secure a portion of the business property of the defendants for the purpose of widening a 20-foot
gravelled roadway into a 40-foot concrete street. The trial court
excluded expert testimony as to the value of defendant's grocery and
liquor business, based among other elements on gross sales and net
operating profit, on the ground that damage to a business is not a
proper element of compensation. Upon appeal it was held, with one
justice dissenting, that a "going business" is property for which recovery can be had in eminent domain proceedings and that the
evidence should have been admitted. The error beine prejudicial, a
reversal was ordered. Priolo v. City of Dallas, 234 S.W.2d 1014 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1950).
It has generally been held in the absence of statute, that the 5th
amendment of the Federal constitution and similar provisions in state
constitutions do not require that compensation be paid where a business is injured or destroyed in connection with the taking of property
for public use under eminent domain proceedings.'
Thus injury to
a business is generally considered damnum absque injuria' either on
the theory that there is no taking and the owner is free to carry on
his business elsewhere,' or that a business is less tangible in nature
than the rights which the constitution undertakes to protect.' However,.it is proper for a government to pay going concern value where
it intends to utilize the business and where the owner is, by the
monopolistic nature of the enterprise, deprived of the right to carry
on the business elsewhere.'
The rationale of the so-called public
utility cases-that when the taking has the inevitable effect of depriving the owner of the going concern value of his business there
has been a compensable taking of property-has been applied to a
I

2

3

United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943); Mitchell v. United
States, 267 U.S.- 341 (1925); United States v. Stephenson Brick Co., 110
F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1940). For an outline of the various constitutional
provisions see Lewis, Eminent Domain §15 et seq. (3rd ed. 1909). For
an excellent article describing the growth of the concept of "property" in
eminent domain proceedings see 41 Yale L.J. 221 (1931).
Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 Pac. 705
(1916).
Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925); Cobb v. Boston, 109
Mass. 438, 444 (1872); Ranlet v. Concord Ry., 62 N.H. 561, 564

(1883).

Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 182 Mass. 245, 65 N.E. 52 (1902).
Omaha v. Omaha Water Co. 218 U.S. 180, 202 (1910), (municipal
water system taken); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 337-341 (1893)
(lock and dam appropriated); Lebanon &
Nashville Turnpike Co. v. Creveling, 159 Tenn. 147, 17 S.W.2d 22, 26
(1929), (toll turnpike condemned for public highway use).

